Tag Archives: GmbH

Priorities During the Pandemic: How to Run a Lab Under COVID-19

By Dr. Peter Krause, Udo Lampe
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, most testing laboratories have been classified as relevant for the system or as carrying out essential activities for national governments. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain activities and optimally assess the changes that are occurring, framed within the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Analytica Alimentaria GmbH, a testing laboratory with its headquarters in Berlin, Germany and a branch office in Almeria, Spain, decided to focus its management on the analysis of events and the options available, at the legal and employment level, to ensure continuity of activities and reducing, as much as possible, the damage for the parties involved: employees and company. Accredited by the International Accreditation Service (IAS) to ISO/IEC 17025:2017, Analytica Alimentaria GmbH is required to implement risk-based thinking to identify, assess and treat risks and opportunities for the laboratory. Since March 12, 2020 a crisis committee was established, formed by the six members of the company’s management, covering general management, human resources, direction of production, finance and IT. The committee meets every day and it intends to:

  • Minimize the risks of contagion
  • Be able to continue providing the service required by our clients
  • ensure that the company as a whole will survive the economic impact of the crisis
  • Take measures that are within the legality of both countries where the laboratory operates (Spain and Germany),
  • Manage internal and external communication related to the crisis

To achieve correct decision making, daily meetings of the committee were established, to review the situations that were presented day after day and the actions that should be carried out. Each decision was analysed in a prioritized, objective, collaborative and global way.

The basis of the lab’s action plan was a well-developed risk assessment. In addition to the risk of getting a droplet or smear/contact infection with the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (risk I) by contact with other people, psychological stress caused by changing working conditions (home office), contact options and information channels were also identified (risk II).

As a result of the risk assessment, the conclusion was that a mix of various measures is the best form of prevention:

  • Keep distance
  • Avoid “super spreader” events
  • Personal hygiene
  • Regular communication between managers and personnel about the current situation and possible scenarios

The risk assessment took both areas into account. The following assessment was developed together with an external specialist and focused on risk I:

Risk I Assessment Protective measures / hygiene plan
Organisation
Working hours and break arrangements High Limit the gathering of people and ensure a minimum distance:

  • Relocated work, break and mealtimes
  • Create fixed groups of shift-working staff
  • Time gap of 20 min. between the shifts
  • Enable home office wherever it is possible
Third party access Moderate Few but “well-known” visitors:

  • Reduce the number of visits and keep internal contacts to a minimum
  • Ensure the contact chain
  • Inform visitors about the internal rules and obtain written consent
Dealing with

suspected cases

High Isolation and immediate leave of the company:

  • Contactless fever measurement (in case of typical symptoms)
  • Leave the company or stay at home
  • If the infection is confirmed, find contact persons (including customers or visitors) and inform them about a possible risk of infection
Contact with other persons
Traffic route from home to work Moderate Avoid public transportation:

  • Take a car, bicycle or go by foot
  • Enable mobile work and teleworking
At work High Always keep a sufficient distance of 2.0 m from people:

  • If minimum distances cannot be maintained, wear protective masks or install physical barriers (acrylic glass)
  • Organize traffic routes so that minimum distances can be maintained (one-way routes, floor markings indicating a distance of 2 m)
  • Use digital meetings instead of physical ones
Sanitary facilities Moderate Remove virus-loaded droplet as often as possible:

  • Provide skin-friendly liquid soaps and towel dispensers
  • Shorten or intensify cleaning intervals
  • Hang out instructions for washing hands at the sink
  • Include instructions for proper hand-disinfection
Canteens, tea kitchens and break rooms High One person per 10 m² = minimum:

  • Reduce the number of chairs per table
  • Informative signs in every room, indicating the maximum number of permitted persons
Ventilation High Diluting or removing bioaerosols (1 µm virus-droplets):

  • Leave as many doors open as possible
  • Regular and documented shock ventilation every 30 minutes or more frequently, depending on the size of window
  • Operate ventilation and air-conditioning systems, since the transmission risk is classified as low here
Use of work equipment Moderate Use tools and work equipment for personal use:

  • Regular cleaning with changing use (PC, hand tools, coffee machine, …)
  • If possible, use gloves when using equipment for a larger number of users
Protective masks Moderate
  • Use of protective masks as an additional measure, indicating that this does not replace keeping distance
  • Recommend wearing masks in commonly used areas and explain that they do not protect yourself, but help to protect others
  • Give clear instructions (written and oral) on how to use a mask correctly and explain the use and purpose of different mask-types
  • Distribute masks freely

A number of guidelines and concrete measures addressing the risks related to health issues are already in place. Those health issues in risk group II are more closely related to the psychological effects of the crisis, however, are also more complex to mitigate. The key strategy is communication and, in particular, actively listening to all employees of the company.

Analytica’s robust company culture, based on values established in coordination with the whole staff, has been of significant help during the crisis. The some 150 staff members are organized by over 22 team coordinators. During the crisis, active communication has been intensified significantly. The crisis management team set up regular alignment meetings with all the coordinators and with individual persons with particular situations. This way, not only was it possible to explain the development of the crisis and the subsequent measures, the conversations with coordinators were also the most important source of information enabling the appropriate decisions. The coordinators, closely aligned and in sync with management, were then able to communicate with their team members with a high degree of confidence. One outcome of the communication was a measure that proved very effective in fortifying trust within the company: all measures and evaluations, as well as a chronological review, are published in a dynamic internal report and are made available, with full transparency, to all staff members. Besides the many individual and group alignment meetings (usually held by video conference), this has been a key measure to establish confidence and security within the company.

On the other hand, the company made a great effort to balance the effect of the general closure of kindergartens and schools in Spain and Germany. Each case where staff members were required to care for children at home was studied individually and agreements were established, adapting shifts and making use of time accounts, to allow childcare at home without significant loss of income.

The success of the measures is shown by the continuous work of both laboratories during the crisis. Besides the personal tragedy of a possible infection, the identified risk to the company has the consequence of a (partial) quarantine due to an infected person in contact with the staff and the consequent loss of work-power which might lead, in extreme cases, to a closure of the laboratory. According to the governmental regulation in Germany, if an infection occurs (confirmed by the health department), contact persons cat. 1 (more than 15 min. contact face to face) are identified and sent to quarantine. Other contact persons, e.g. contact persons cat. 2 (same room without face to face) must be identified quickly with the collaboration of the infected person and notified and, if necessary, sent in quarantine. In this case, there is a confirmed emergency plan that maintains the laboratory’s ability to work, defining replacements and alternative work-flow strategies.

It has been part of our strategy to validate all our measures with the relevant guidance documents made available by the official competent institutions. The German Federal Office for Public Safety and Civil Protection (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) has published a guide, “Crisis Management in Companies, 9-point Checklist” especially for critical infrastructure companies in the CoVid-19 crisis.

Having been classified as a core business enterprise (Spain) and “relevant to the system” (Germany), we consider it important to use them as a reference to confirm our level of alignment with your proposal for crisis management.

An important effect, relevant to any leader in times of crisis, is that the confirmation of all points of such a checklist provides certain peace of mind regarding the question: Have we done everything we could?

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From CannTrust To Canopy: Is There A Connection To Current Cannabis Scandals?

By Marguerite Arnold
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As Europe swooned under record-breaking heat this summer, the cannabis industry also found itself in a rather existential hot seat.

The complete meltdown at CannTrust has yet to reach a conclusion. Yes, a few  jobs have been lost. However, a greater question is in the room as criminal investigatory and financial regulatory agencies on both sides of the US-Canada border (plus in Europe) are getting involved.

As events have shown, there is a great, big, green elephant in the room that is now commanding attention. Beyond CannTrust, how widespread were these problematic practices? And who so far has watched, participated, if not profited, and so far, said nothing?

Who, What, Where?

The first name in the room? Canopy Growth.Canopy_Growth_Corporation_logo

Why the immediate association? Bruce Linton, according to news reports, was fired as CEO by his board the same day, July 3, 2019, that CannTrust received its first cease and desist notice from Health Canada.

Further, there is a remarkable similarity in not only problematic practices, but timing between the two companies. This may also indicate that Canopy’s board believed that Linton’s behaviour was uncomfortably close to executive misdeeds at CannTrust. Not to mention, this was not the first scandal that Linton had been anywhere close to around acquisition time. See the Mettrum pesticide debacle, that also broke right around the time Canopy purchased the company in late 2016 as well as the purchase of MedCann GmbH in Germany.

Reorg also appears to be underway in Europe as well. As of August, Paul Steckler has been brought in as “Managing Director Europe” and is now based in Frankfurt. Given the company’s history of “co-ceo’ing” Linton out the door, is more change to come?

What Went Down At Canopy?

Last year, Canopy announced its listing on the NYSE in May. To put this in context, this was two months after the first German cultivation bid went down to legal challenge. By August 15, 2018 with a new bid in the offing, the company had closed the second of its multi-billion dollar investments from Constellation.

Bruce Linton, former CEO of Canopy Growth
Photo: Youtube, TSX

Yet by late October, after Bruce Linton skipped a public markets conference in Frankfurt where many of the leading Canadian cannabis company execs showed up to lobby Jens Spahn (the health minister of Germany) about the bid if not matters relating to the Deutsche Börse, there were two ugly rumours afoot.

Video showing dead plants at Canopy’s BC facility surfaced. Worse, according to the chatter online at least, this was the second “crop failure” at the facility in British Columbia. Even more apparently damning? This all occurred during the same  time period that the second round of lawsuits against the reconstituted German cultivation bid surfaced.

Canopy in turn issued a statement that this destruction was not caused by company incompetence but rather a delay in licensing procedures from Health Canada. Despite lingering questions of course, about why a company would even start cultivation in an unlicensed space, not once but apparently twice.  And further, what was the real impact of the destruction on the company’s bottom line?

Seen within the context of other events, it certainly poses an interesting question, particularly, in hindsight.

Canopy, which made the finals in the first German cultivation bid, was dropped in the second round – and further, apparently right as the news hit about the BC facility. Further, no matter the real reason behind the same, Canopy clearly had an issue with accounting for crops right as Canadian recreational reform was coming online and right as the second German cultivation bid was delayed by further legal action last fall.

Has Nobody Seen This Coming?

In this case, the answer is that many people have seen the writing on the wall for some time. At least in Germany, the response in general has been caution. To put this in true international perspective, these events occurred against a backdrop of the first increase in product over the border with Holland via a first-of-its kind agreement between the German health ministry and Dutch authorities. Followed just before the CannTrust scandal hit, with the announcement that the amount would be raised a second time.

German health authorities, at least, seem doubtful that Canadian companies can provide enough regulated product. Even by import. The Deutsche Börse has put the entire public Canadian and American cannabis sector under special watch since last summer.

Common Territories

By the turn of 2019, Canopy had announced its expansion into the UK (after entering the Danish market itself early last year) and New York state.

And of course by April, the company unveiled plans to buy Acreage in the U.S.

Yet less than two weeks later, Canopy announced not new cultivation facilities in Europe, but plans to buy Bionorica, the established German manufacturer of dronabinol – the widely despised (at least by those who have only this option) synthetic that is in fact, prescribed to two thirds of Germany’s roughly 50,000 cannabis patients.

By August 2019, right after the Canopy Acreage deal was approved by shareholders, Canopy announced it had lost just over $1 billion in the last three months.

Or, to put this in perspective, 20% of the total investment from Constellation about one year ago.

What Happened At CannTrust And How Do Events Line Up?

The current scandal is not the first at CannTrust either. In November 2017, CannTrust was warned by Health Canada for changing its process for creating cannabis oil without submitting the required paperwork. By March of last year however, the company was able to successfully list on the Toronto stock exchange.

Peter Aceto arrived at CannTrust as the new CEO on October 1 last year along with new board member John Kaken at the end of the month. Several days later the company also announced that it too, like other major cannabis companies including Canopy, was talking to “beverage companies.” It was around this time that illegal growing at CannTrust apparently commenced. Six weeks later, the company announces its intent to also list on the NYSE. Two days later, both the CEO and chair of the board were notified of the grow and chose not to stop it.

Apparently, their decision was even unchanged after the video and resulting online outrage about the same over the destroyed crops at the Canopy facility in BC surfaced online.

On May 10, just over a week after the Bioronica purchase in Germany, the first inklings of a scandal began to hit CannTrust in Canada. A whisteblower inside the company quit after sending a mass email to all employees about his concerns. Four days later, the company announced the successful completion of their next round of financing, and further that they had raised 25.5 million more than they hoped.

Six weeks later, on June 14, Health Canada received its warning about discrepancies at CannTrust. The question is, why did it take so long?

Where Does This Get Interesting?

The strange thing about the comparisons between CannTrust and Canopy, beyond similarities of specific events and failings, is of course their timing. That also seems to have been apparent at least to board members at Canopy – if not a cause for alarm amongst shareholders themselves. One week after Health Canada received its complaint about CannTrust, shareholders voted to approve the Canopy-Acreage merger, on June 21.

Yet eight days after that, as Health Canada issued an order to cease distribution to CannTrust, the Canopy board fired Bruce Linton.

One week after that, the Danish recipient of CannTrust’s product, also announced that they were halting distribution in Europe. By the end of August, Danish authorities were raising alarms about yet another problem – namely that they do not trust CannTrust’s assurances about delivery of pesticide-free product.

Is this coincidence or something else?

If like Danish authorities did in late August 2019, calling for a systematic overhaul of their own budding cannabis ecosystem (where both Canadian companies operate), the patterns and similarities here may prove more than that. Sit tight for at least a fall of more questions, if not investigations.

Beyond one giant cannabis conspiracy theory, in other words, the problems, behaviour and response of top executives at some of the largest companies in the business appear to be generating widespread calls – from not only regulators, but from whistle blowers and management from within the industry itself – for some serious, regulatory and even internal company overhauls. Internationally.

And further on a fairly existential basis.


EDITOR’S NOTE: CIJ reached out to Canopy Growth’s European HQ for comment by email. None was returned.

Correction: This article has been updated to show that the Danish recipient of Canntrust’s product announced they were halting distribution one week after Bruce Linton’s firing, not one day. 

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Focus on Canopy Growth: International Pioneer On A Global Mission

By Marguerite Arnold
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Read the glossy website or encounter their expensive marketing materials and lush swag at any upscale international cannabis business conference these days and you get a certain kind of impression. The new, modernist, chic European HQ in central Frankfurt, for example, with its floor-to-ceiling windows and breath-taking view of the city, river and mountains, continues to give that perspective far from home.The company has been at the forefront of the Canadian cannabis industry since 2013 and has subsequently weathered several mergers, buyouts and creative partnerships of all kinds.

But what’s of great interest about Canopy is that its highly slick corporate image is backed up by a solid performance elsewhere to date– and on a number of important, and globally impactful levels. Further, the company’s willingness to think strategically, globally, and take calculated, well-timed risks at the same time proves to be effective.

The Canadian Beginnings

The company has been at the forefront of the Canadian cannabis industry since 2013 and has subsequently weathered several mergers, buyouts and creative partnerships of all kinds. In the process it has also made financial history in the cannabis industry, becoming the first publicly listed cannabis company in the world a year after its founding.

Canopy_Growth_Corporation_logoSo much of its iconic corporate history is in fact, ironically fading in the rapid birth of the full on recreational market at home. However, here is the elevator pitch. Born as Tweed, in 2013, in an abandoned former Hershey chocolate plant and the recipient of one of Canada’s first medical cultivation licenses, the company rapidly expanded with increased market access that reform brought. Inevitably, its success also spawned one of its closest competitors (Cannabis Wheaton Income Corp) after co-founder Chuck Rifici was ousted by a unanimous vote of the Canopy board.

In 2018, Canopy Growth still maintains its reputation as the first Canadian cannabis unicorn, even though its stock price is just half that of close competitor, Tilray.

In Canada, the company has long expanded adroitly beyond its central HQ with strategic partnerships and buyouts that range the gamut of grow and branding opportunities that are becoming increasingly as mainstream as, well, beer. These days, Canopy is well-poised to take advantage of the shifting Canadian regulatory landscape on several fronts.

The first is undeniably medical. The company has made patient access a cornerstone of its continuing market development strategy. In fact, current CEO and original cofounder, Bruce Linton, has recently told the press that in his view the medical market globally is the company’s first and most profitable focus.

No matter how many beer companies come calling. And that is also one of the company’s more notable, if not newsworthy accomplishments.

International Aspirations

However it is on the international side that the company has really distinguished itself. That starts with the early (relatively speaking) and active interest in what was going on far from Canadian shores. Initially in Europe (but not limited to it). And even more centrally, how and where the company expanded its global medical reach.Canopy has spread its influence widely throughout Europe already

That started, from the Canopy perspective, with the decision to buy the small German GmbH called MedCann (now Spectrum Cannabis, the global medical brand of Canopy). Located just south of Frankfurt, an international but small team of globally experienced entrepreneurs managed to obtain the first import license for medical flower from Canada into Germany in the summer of 2016. Guided by the industry knowledge and business savvy if not entrepreneurial zeal that so often leads to naught, Pierre Debs and team faced a market still sceptical of medicinal cannabis domestically, and the burden of being “first.” Canopy was not yet in Europe, but they had more ready access to the market and capital. The Canopy buyout of MedCann was accomplished on December 12, 2016, six months before the first iteration of the German cultivation bid was announced. Canopy later announced that it had become one of the top ten finalists in the first iteration of the now restarted German cultivation bid.

Beyond Germany however, this unique team with deep local and global knowledge also began an immediate expansion policy in Europe and beyond that is still unfolding. Apparently in similar strategy adopted at home in the Canadian provinces, Canopy has spread its influence widely throughout Europe already. With an enormous supply contract from Spain’s Alcaliber and operations in Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and a few more (still currently unnamed) operations rolling out any day, the company is clearly building a solid, strategically dispersed infrastructure that reaches far beyond Europe, with global impact and influence.

Exhibit A? In April of this year, the company launched Spectrum Australia with support from the Victorian government.

Controversies

The biggest controversy facing the company so far, albeit indirectly, involves pesticides. This issue occurred during the acquisition of an outside company called Mettrum. In other words, Canopy inherited the production liabilities of a purchased company. The acquisition, however, which passed the buck to Canopy to fix, was actually an opportunity for Canopy to implement its own high internal production and quality controls throughout Mettrum facilities.

This was not inexpensive or of small impact (it affected 21,000 medical users). In addition to taking a leadership role in addressing their acquisition’s production issues, CEO Linton publicly apologized to affected patients.

The company has also been on the forefront of the banking and financing regulatory problems that have plagued the industry (so far successfully).